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  INTRODUCTION   
Economic development requires “political institutions that 
credibly commit the state to honor economic and political 
rights.”1 It is widely considered that federalism, or more specif-
ically, interjurisdictional competition, can force local govern-
ments to protect property rights.2 China is a unitary country by 
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virtue of its constitution, but leading scholars believe that its 
economic success, which has occurred with neither rule of law 
nor democracy, is attributable to a de facto federalist system.3 
Most notably, Professor Barry Weingast and his co-authors 
coined the term “market-preserving federalism” (MPF) to de-
scribe decentralized economic governance and interjurisdic-
tional competition in China.4 MPF scholars have examined the 
impact of fiscal federalism, that is, fiscal autonomy and hard-
budget constraints for local governments, on China’s economic 
development.5 
But does MPF apply to land institutions? Does interjuris-
dictional competition force local governments to protect land 
rights? As Professor Steven Cheung, a pioneer in law and eco-
nomics, has pointed out, land is the most important asset that 
Chinese local governments have to compete with one another 
on economic development.6 Therefore, understanding the rela-
tionship between land rights and federalism is central to any 
claim that MPF is the political foundation of China’s economic 
success.7 Unfortunately there has been no research on the pow-
er allocation and interactions between the central and local 
governments on property rights. Even Cheung takes land insti-
tutions as a given and does not examine the impact of inter-
jurisdictional competition on the development of land institu-
tions.8 
This Article examines whether federalism protects land 
rights in China from two dimensions. I first compare national 
 
& MARY L. REV. 301 (1993). For a critique, see generally Ilya Somin, Federal-
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 3. Eric Maskin & Chenggang Xu, Soft Budget Constraint Theories: From 
Centralization to the Market, 9 ECON. OF TRANSITION 1, 10–11 (2001); Gabriel-
la Montinola et al., Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Econom-
ic Success in China, 48 WORLD POL. 50, 56 (1995); Yingyi Qian & Barry R. 
Weingast, Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives, 11 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 83, 86–90 (1997); Weingast, supra note 1, at 21–24; Chenggang 
Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development, 49 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 1076, 1105 (2011). For a critique of market-preserving fed-
eralism, see generally Hongbin Cai and Daniel Treisman, Did Government De-
centralization Cause China’s Economic Miracle?, 58 WORLD POL. 505 (2006); 
Jonathan Rodden & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Preserve Mar-
kets?, 83 VA. L. REV. 1521 (1997). 
 4. See Weingast, supra note 1, at 3. 
 5. See, e.g., id. at 8; Montinola et al., supra note 3, at 66, 72. 
 6. See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Economic System of China, 1 MAN & 
ECON. 1, 18 (2014) (concerning intercounty competition in China). 
 7. See Montinola et al., supra note 3, at 51. 
 8. See generally Cheung, supra note 6. 
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law with local institutions of eminent domain, revealing that 
local governments take much more land than the national gov-
ernment approves, frequently violating, tweaking, and chal-
lenging national law. I next examine the impact of interjuris-
dictional competition on the development of local land 
institutions, demonstrating that local governments are weaken-
ing individual land rights for the benefits of mobile capital. 
Overall, Chinese federalism weakens rather than strengthens 
individual land rights and should be called rights-weakening 
federalism. 
This China case also has general theoretical implications. 
For decades, leading property law scholars in the United States 
have debated whether federalism protects land rights but have 
achieved no consensus.9 The existing debate centers around the 
immobility of land, 10 however, this Article argues that land 
immobility is not an essential factor. The structure and power 
of local governance, the balance between land and capital in 
particular, matters much more. Hence, the better question to 
ask with respect to interjurisdictional competition is who bene-
fits from the competition. This Article also poses a more fun-
damental challenge to the literature on interjurisdictional com-
petition by adopting agglomeration economics, which poses the 
question of whether such competition constitutes sorting or ag-
glomeration.11 All the existing literature on property rights and 
federalism presumes a market of sorting—that investors are 
indifferent to location, and are thus attracted by local govern-
ments offering the best price or strongest protection.12 Howev-
er, urbanization and industrialization in China are actually a 
process of agglomeration, which determines that a few cities 
with a natural, or at least initial, advantage are taking over, 
and the local governments of the remainder will therefore even-
tually lose in the competition.13 The implication is that inter-
jurisdictional competition is actually a race to the bottom for 
 
 9. See generally supra note 2; see also Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights 
Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 149–51 (1992) (discussing 
limitations and promising aspects of federalism). 
 10. See generally Been, supra note 2; Ellickson, supra note 2; Epstein, su-
pra note 9; Somin, supra note 2. 
 11. For a more thorough explanation of agglomeration economics, see gen-
erally MASAHISA FUJITA & JACQUES-FRANÇOIS THISSE, ECONOMICS OF AG-
GLOMERATION: CITIES, INDUSTRIAL LOCATION, AND GLOBALIZATION (2013) (ex-
ploring theories of economic geography and urban economics that concern 
differing concentrations of economic activity around the world). 
 12. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra Part II.C. 
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most local governments rather than a win-win game as the 
sorting literature suggests. 
The Article is structured as follows. Part I examines the al-
location of power regarding land institutions between national 
law and local laws and finds that local governments fail to hon-
or national laws on property rights protection. It also explores 
the sources of local power in China’s authoritarian regime and 
identifies the patterns of national-local interactions reflected in 
different forms of illegal local practices. Part II then evaluates 
whether competition matters for land rights, arguing that land 
immobility is not the key factor and, hence, that the focus 
should be the nature of competition and whose interests are 
served. Part III concludes with a reflection on the paradoxical 
nature of authoritarian federalism and possible directions for 
reform, thereby setting an agenda for future work. 
I.  WHO IS THE GUARDIAN? NATIONAL LAW VERSUS 
ILLEGAL TAKINGS   
After Kelo v. City of New London,14 many state and local 
governments in the United States voluntarily committed to not 
pursuing eminent domain for the purpose of economic develop-
ment.15 Professor Ellickson takes this as evidence of “federal-
ism at work,” that is, local governments constraining them-
selves from abusing property rights under the pressure of 
interjurisdictional competition, and further argues that a deci-
sion or baseline need not be delineated at the national level.16 
Professors Epstein and Somin disagree that interjurisdictional 
competition provides adequate protection for immobile assets.17 
The two parties disagree upon whether local governments pro-
vide better or the same property rights protection than the fed-
eral government, 18  but neither worries about the possibility 
 
 14. 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that although a sovereign generally may 
not assert its eminent domain power to effectuate a transfer of property from 
one private party to another, it may constitutionally do so where it is part of 
an economic development plan which serves the public purpose, even if the 
condemned property would not eventually be open to the public). 
 15. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 2, at 763. See generally Ilya Somin, The 
Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 2100 (2009) (describing the “massive backlash” against Kelo by state leg-
islatures enacting anti-eminent domain laws).  
 16. Ellickson, supra note 2, at 762. 
 17. Compare Epstein, supra note 9, at 150 (describing competition as “the 
great virtue of federalism”), with Somin, supra note 2, at 57–66 (arguing that 
competitive federalism provides insufficient protection for property rights). 
 18. See supra note 17. 
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that local governments can be worse than the federal govern-
ment at protecting property rights. The aforementioned disa-
greement concerns only whether local governments’ decisions to 
constrain their own power of eminent domain after Kelo are 
nominal or substantive.19 Think about the opposite situation: 
had the Supreme Court decided in Kelo that local governments 
could not take property from one private party and transfer it 
to another even for the purpose of economic development, local 
governments’ eminent domain power would have been severely 
constrained. Would such constraint be effective, however? 
The boundary between national and local power is tricky to 
identify. Scholars have documented encroachment from both 
directions in the United States: backdoor federalization, in 
which federal power expands to an arena originally belonging 
to a state or local government;20 and uncooperative federalism, 
in which state or local governments encroach upon federal ju-
risdiction over particular issues.21 Both the federal and state 
governments can contest their jurisdictions, and the boundaries 
are often blurry. In a centralized, authoritarian country such as 
China, however, the boundaries seem at first glance to be 
clearer cut. All power stems from the national authority, which 
decides what local governments can and cannot do. In the spe-
cific context of takings, the national law establishes a system of 
top-down control combined with quotas specifying how much 
land a local government can take.22 Nevertheless, local gov-
ernments do rebel. Many of their takings decisions clearly vio-
late national law and are, therefore, illegal.23 
Illegal takings constitute clear evidence that local govern-
ments in China take more land than national law allows. This 
is markedly different from United States state and local gov-
ernments instituting higher standards constraining themselves 
from exercising eminent domain power in the post-Kelo back-
lash.24 In other words, in China national law and the national 
authority have established a baseline and quotas for eminent 
 
 19. See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 761–63; Somin, supra note 15, at 2154. 
 20. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federali-
zation, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1353–58 (2006).  
 21. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Fed-
eralism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1271 (2008).  
 22. See Shitong Qiao, The Politics of Chinese Land: Partial Reform, Vested 
Interests, and Small Property, 29 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 70, 98–102 (2015).  
 23. See infra Part I.C.1.  
 24. See Somin, supra note 15, at 2114–48. 
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domain that local governments clearly encroach upon.25 Accord-
ingly, local governments provide weaker property rights protec-
tion than the national authority. However, it seems counterin-
tuitive that local governments in such a centralized, 
authoritarian regime could encroach upon the national authori-
ty on such a phenomenal scale. Compared with the national au-
thority in a federalist system such as the United States, an au-
thoritarian regime such as China is expected to exercise 
stricter control over local authorities, which are expected in 
turn to behave like “servants” serving only one “master.”26 An 
important question is thus where local governments’ power 
comes from. How can they operate contrary to national law? If, 
in a federalist and democratic country, we see contest and ten-
sion within the system as a checks-and-balances mechanism, 
then how should we view the illegal behaviors of local govern-
ments in an authoritarian regime? Related to the foregoing is-
sues is whether there is any variation in illegality in the con-
flicts between national and local authorities in China and, if so, 
what it tells us. 
This Part lays out a dynamic system describing the inter-
actions between national and local authorities in China’s au-
thoritarian regime. The system is interesting in that, on the 
one hand, there seems to be a clear and simple boundary be-
tween the two sets of authorities, while, on the other, local gov-
ernments appear to hold the power to break national laws and 
encroach upon the national authority. Moreover, the different 
ways in which local authorities depart from national law, as re-
flected in a taxonomy of illegality, exert differing impacts on 
the national and local agendas. Section A introduces the na-
tional law of eminent domain; Section B analyzes the sources of 
local power; and Section C presents a taxonomy of illegality and 
discusses the different central-local dynamics under each cate-
gory of illegality.  
A. PROPERTY AS NATIONAL LAW 
Property law does not have to be national, and in many 
countries is not.27 However, China’s unitary system applies to 
 
 25. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 26. Cf. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 21, at 1265–71 (describing 
the ways state and local governments are subservient to the national govern-
ment). 
 27. See, e.g., Serkin, supra note 2 (proposing a system allowing local gov-
ernments to choose what kind of property regime to have). 
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every area of law, including property law.28 The Chinese prop-
erty law system is comprised of the Constitution, Law on Legis-
lation (LOL), Property Law (PL),29 Land Administration Law 
(LAL), Rural Land Contract Law, and Urban Real Estate Ad-
ministration Law, through which the division of power between 
the central and local authorities regarding land administration 
and rights is defined.30 Beyond the specific division of power 
are two general principles. The first is contained in article 8 of 
the LOL, which defines the exclusive authority of the national 
legislature—the National People’s Congress and its Standing 
Committee—including the authority to regulate the expropria-
tion of private property and basic civil law institutions.31 The 
second is the numerus clausus principle, instituted by article 5 
of the PL, which states that “[t]he categories and contents of 
property rights shall be stipulated by law.”32 Again, this princi-
ple gives exclusive authority to the national legislature to de-
fine and regulate the categories and contents of property 
rights.33 These two principles together determine the exclusive 
 
 28. See XIANFA art. 3 (2004) (China) (emphasizing the centralized leader-
ship of the national authority). 
 29. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wuquan Fa (中华人民共和国物权法) 
[Property Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Stand-
ing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), http:// 
www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471118.htm (China). 
 30. See, e.g., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengshi Fangdichan Guanli 
Fa (中华人民共和国城市房地产管理法) [Urban Real Estate Administration Law] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, effec-
tive Jan. 1, 1995, amended on Aug. 30, 2007 and Aug. 27, 2009), arts. 7, 11, 12, 
14 (China). 
 31. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa (中华人民共和国立法法) 
[Law on Legislation] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000), art. 8 (China) (“The following 
matters shall only be governed by laws: . . . (7) Expropriation and requisition 
of property not owned by the state; (8) The basic system of civil mat-
ters . . . .” (author’s translation)).  
 32. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wuquan Fa (中华人民共和国物权法) 
[Property Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Stand-
ing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), art. 5 
(China). 
 33. The National People’s Congress (and in certain situations, its Stand-
ing Committee), can make laws (法律), XIANFA arts. 58, 62 (1982) (China), as 
opposed to administrative regulations, which are made by the State Council    
(行政法规), departmental regulations, which are made by departments of the 
State Council (部门规章), and local regulations, which are made by local peo-
ple’s congresses (地方性法规). See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa (中华
人民共和国立法法) [Law on Legislation] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000), arts. 7, 65, 72, 80 
(China). 
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authority of national legislation in regulating property rights. 
Two considerations underpin this institutional design. First, 
affording local authorities and various government agencies the 
power to make rules concerning property rights would likely 
impose an overly high information cost that would jeopardize 
national unification and the common market.34 The second con-
sideration is the potential power abuses by other authorities, 
including local authorities. Only the national legislature can 
serve as the guardian of property rights, a basic citizen right 
sanctioned by the constitution.35 In addition, the LAL also in-
stitutes a top-down control system for land expropriation.36 Ac-
cording to that law, the expropriation of agricultural land must 
satisfy three requirements: (1) consistency with the land use 
plan; (2) approval for its conversion to construction land; and 
(3) land expropriation approval from the provincial-level gov-
ernment or State Council. 37  The national government is in 
charge of making annual land use plans, which specify the 
amount of land to be expropriated and allocate expropriation 
quotas to local governments.38 
B. LOCAL POWER IN AN AUTHORITARIAN COUNTRY: WHERE 
DOES IT COME FROM?  
Local power in China arises from two sources. The first I 
refer to as the power of numbers: the sheer size of the country 
and its numerous subnational units make it costly, if not im-
possible, for the central authority to monitor local governments. 
The second can be called “the power of the servant”: the inte-
gration of and interdependence between the national and local 
authorities entitle the latter to a say in the decision-making 
process and afford them a louder voice in the system.39 
 
 34. Liang Huixing (梁慧星), (是物权法定还是物权自由) [Numerus Clausus 
or Numerus Apertus?], (人民法院报) [PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY] (Nov. 20, 2006), 
http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showarticle.asp?id=1974. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanli (中华人民共和国土地管
理法) [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., June 25, 1986, amended on Aug. 29, 1998 and Aug. 28, 2004), 
arts. 44–45, 52, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_ 
1383939.htm (China). 
 37. Id.  
 38. See id. arts. 4, 18, 21, 43–45.  
 39. See Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 35–40 (2010). 
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More than three thousand city- and county-level govern-
ments in China conduct the daily management of and exercise 
control over the land within their jurisdictions, either within or 
beyond national government authorization. 40  Hayek argued 
that local information is key to understanding whether produc-
tion should be centralized or decentralized.41 A recent Ameri-
can Economic Review article reveals that information costs de-
termine whether the Chinese national government retains or 
relinquishes control over state-owned enterprises.42 The same 
logic applies to state land ownership. Information costs are the 
main reason for the Chinese national government’s failure to 
compete with local governments over control of the land.43 The 
sheer number of local-government units makes direct control by 
the national government infeasible.44 The national government 
has tried to strengthen its control over land by setting up re-
gional land-monitoring offices, separate from local govern-
ments.45 Nevertheless, if we compare the number of Ministry of 
Land and Resources (MLR) employees with the total number of 
land-administration staff employed by over three thousand lo-
cal governments, the former is but a tiny fraction of the lat-
ter. 46  As a result, the national government has even been 
forced to give up its share of land-sale revenue.47 
 
 40. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, through 2015, 
there were 334 city-level and 2850 county-level administrative regions in Chi-
na. See NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA (中华人民共和国国家统计局), 
CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK § 1-1 (中国统计年鉴) (2016), http://www.stats 
.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexch.htm.  
 41. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 
524–26 (1945). 
 42. See generally Zhangkai Huang et al., Hayek, Local Information, and 
Commanding Heights: Decentralizing State-Owned Enterprises in China, 
107 AM. ECON. REV. 2455 (2017) (explaining that lower information costs tend 
to lead to less decentralization, and vice versa). 
 43. See id. at 2456. 
 44. See id. 
 45. For example, in 2006 the State Council approved the establishment of 
nine land-supervising offices across the country, aiming at supervising the 
land administration of local governments. See Guowuyuan Bangongting 
Guanyu Jianli Guojia Tudi Ducha Zhidu Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi (国务院办
公厅关于建立国家土地督察制度有关问题的通知) [Notice of the State Council Of-
fice on the Establishment of the National Land Supervision Institution] 
(promulgated by State Council Office No. 50, July 13, 2006, effective July 13, 
2006) (China). 
 46. This can be shown by comparing the number of local administrative 
regions, and thus the number of land-administration offices all around the 
country, with the central-government level, where there is only one Depart-
ment of Land Resource. See NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, supra 
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Judged by population and the amount of land within their 
respective jurisdictions, Chinese provinces are comparable to 
many European countries, and tend to be too large as economic 
development units, whereas townships tend to be too small.48 
Cities and counties, in contrast, tend to be of an efficient scale 
for economic management.49 In China’s economic reform pro-
cess, cities and counties have thus become the administrative 
units that actually manage the economy.50 Because land is the 
main instrument for financing and promoting economic devel-
opment in the Chinese case, 51 city and county governments 
cannot manage the economy without effective daily control over 
land. In other words, the allocation of power over land matches 
the allocation of power over the economy. In this sense, Chinese 
local governments are no different from their counterparts in 
the United States. The second source of local power, what Pro-
fessor Gerken dubs the power of the servant,52 is often neglect-
ed. 
The local governments in centralized, authoritarian re-
gimes are supposed to be weaker than their counterparts in 
federal, democratic regimes in which local authorities enjoy le-
gitimacy from the bottom up, as well as inherent independence 
and autonomy from the federal government.53 However, being 
part of the national government can be an advantage. Because 
their membership in the national community is taken for 
granted, as there is no separation between national and local 
authorities, local authorities can legitimately claim entitlement 
to be part of the national decision-making process. Local gov-
ernments are therefore inherently endowed with the power and 
 
note 40, at § 1-1 (listing the divisions of administrative areas in China). 
 47. See Qiao, supra note 22, at 82. 
 48. See Cheung, supra note 6, at 18–19. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See, e.g., Xuejun Du (杜雪君) & Zhonghua Huang (黄忠华), Yi Di Mou 
Fazhan: Tudi Churang yu Jingji Zengzhang de Shizheng Yanjiu (以地谋发展：
土地出让与经济增长的实证研究) [Land forDevelopment: An Empirical Study of 
Urban Land Supply and Economic Growth], 7 (中国土地科学) [CHN. LAND SCI.] 
40, 40–47 (2015); Yonggang Li (李勇刚) & Shijie Zhang (张士杰), Jinsheng Jili, 
Tudi Caizheng yu Jingji Zengzhang Jixiao- Jiyu Zhongbu Liusheng de Mian-
ban Shuju (晋升激励、土地财政与经济增长绩效——基于中部六省的面板数据) 
[Promotion Incentives, Land Finance and the Efficiency of Economic Growth—
Based on the Panel Data of Six Central Provinces], vol. 31, no. 4 JINGJI 
JINGWEI (经济经纬) [ECON. SURVEY] 116, 116–21 (2014). 
 52. Gerken, supra note 39, at 35–40. 
 53. Id. 
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legitimacy to fulfill national policy goals, which from time to 
time supersede the constraints imposed by national law. In 
other words, local governments are national governance insid-
ers and have a voice in shaping the national legal and policy 
agenda. City and county governments constitute a formidable 
interest group in national politics and legislation in China. 
They are represented directly in the national legislature and its 
highest political body, and many of their leaders are already 
national politicians, as is the case of the leaders of Beijing and 
Shanghai, or potential leaders with a promising national politi-
cal career ahead.54 This situation adds a national perspective to 
the daily operation of Chinese local governments. As a result, 
the power of the servant can be much stronger, more prevalent, 
and more effective in China than in federal systems. Local gov-
ernments have a choice as to whether they activate their role 
as national-government servants. They sometimes play that 
role to suit local needs, and sometimes with a true national 
agenda in mind.55 The latter is particularly true for cities with 
a prominent status in the national system or whose leaders 
have national political ambitions.56 
C. TAXONOMY OF ILLEGALITY 
The illegality of local actions, or the conflicts between na-
tional law and local institutions, can take different forms, as 
measured by the tradeoff between the risk of exposure and a 
local authority’s claim of legitimacy: the more a local authority 
seeks legitimacy from a local decision’s national impact, the 
less likely it is to avoid attention, monitoring, and supervision 
by the national authority. Conversely, the more a local authori-
ty defines its decision in purely local terms, the less national 
attention that decision is likely to draw. A local government 
can choose to: (1) operate under the national radar, that is, do 
 
 54. Leaders of Beijing and Shanghai are often also members of the Politi-
cal Bureau—or Politburo—of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of China (CPC), which consists of the top twenty-five national political elites. 
See, e.g., Cheng Li, China’s New Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee, 
BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/ 
chinas-new-politburo-standing-committee (providing profiles of the current 
Politburo members, including party secretaries of Beijing and Shanghai). For 
example, the current leader of Beijing, Cai Qi, is a member of the Politburo. 
See Yamei, Cai Qi – Member of Political Bureau of CPC Central Committee, 
XINHUA (Oct. 25, 2017), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/25/c_ 
136705690.htm. 
 55. See infra, Part II.C. 
 56. Id. 
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what it likes in the hope that the inconsistency of its behavior 
with national law will not be exposed; (2) tweak57 the law to 
suit its needs without openly challenging it; or (3) openly chal-
lenge a particular national law by going beyond it, often invok-
ing a national agenda or higher law, such as the Constitution. 
All three choices create inconsistencies between national law 
and local institutions, and are thus clearly illegal in a technical 
sense in a centralized, authoritarian country such as China, 
but they have different implications. The surprising discovery 
of the current research is that even under the current authori-
tarian regime in China, local governments’ best strategy is of-
ten to go beyond the law, either from the perspective of its own 
interests or with the aim of institutional improvement. 
1. Under the Radar 
Flagrantly illegal behavior often hides under the radar of 
legal enforcement, for example, when local governments take 
land from farmers without authorization. This type of illegal 
taking is different from tweaking the law in the sense that the 
local governments involved do not try to justify their expropria-
tion actions or claim that they are legal. At the same time, 
however, they do not challenge the national eminent domain 
system by appealing to higher laws or goals. Instead, they ac-
cept the legitimacy of the current system and their own illegali-
ty, and simply hope to get by without being discovered or publi-
cized. 
Since the revision of the LAL in 1998, local governments in 
China have faced increasingly stringent institutional con-
straints imposed by the central authority in the land expropria-
tion arena. 58  Although local governments enjoy eminent do-
 
 57. Cf. Gerken, supra note 39, at 46.  
 58. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanli Fa (中华人民共和国土
地管理法) [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., June 25, 1986, amended on Aug. 29, 1998 and Aug. 28, 
2004) (China); the 2004 Constitutional Amendment, Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Xianfa Xiuzheng An (中华人民共和国宪法修正案) [Amendments to 
the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 2004, effective Mar. 14, 2004) (China); Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Wuquan Fa (中华人民共和国物权法) [Property Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l Peo-
ple’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.npc.gov.cn/ 
englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471118.htm (China); Guoyou tudi shang 
fangwu zhengshou yu buchang tiaoli (国有土地上房屋征收与补偿条例) [Regula-
tion on the Expropriation of Buildings on State-owned Land and Compensa-
 2018] RIGHTS-WEAKENING FEDERALISM 1683 
 
main power to expropriate rural land and convert it into urban 
construction land, that power is limited in several ways, most 
importantly by the centralized land-use quota system.59 Anoth-
er limit is the top-down approval system determining that any 
taking without proper authorization is illegal.60 The MLR can 
use satellites to monitor land-use changes on the ground and 
theoretically can find out how much land has been illegally 
taken and where. 61  Even equipped with such a convenient 
technology, however, legal enforcement by the MLR can only 
control, not eliminate, illegal takings. 
According to MLR data, between 2005 and 2015, local gov-
ernments annually appropriated land in the range of 10,000 to 
50,000 hectares without authorization.62 Considering that Chi-
nese farmers own on average 0.09 hectares, 63  local govern-
ments took land away from 100,000 to 500,000 farmers every 
year, in violation of national land use law and quotas. 
2. Tweaking the Law 
A national and centralized legal system is often more 
fragmented and layered than it is centralized and unified. Na-
tional land law in China comprises not only the national PL, 
but also the LAL, an eminent domain ordinance, and a number 
 
tion] (promulgated by the State Council, Jan. 21, 2011, effective Jan. 21, 2011) 
(China).  
 59. Difang Zhengfu Suku Yongdi Zhibiao Buzu Guotubu Fouren Chen Bu 
Quedi (地方政府诉苦用地指标不足 国土部否认称不缺地) [Local Government 
Complains Lack of Land Use Quota While Department of Land Resource De-
nied], FIRST FIN. DAILY (第一财经日报) (Jan. 11, 2011), http://business.sohu 
.com/20110111/n278788848.shtml (discussing government plans to reform the 
use of quotas).  
 60. Hayek, supra note 41, at 524 (discussing the advantages of central 
planners leaving some decisions to the “man on the spot”). 
 61. See, e.g., Guotu Ziyuanbu Guanyu Kaizhan 2016 Niandu Tudi 
Kuangchan Weipian Zhifa Jiandu Jiancha Gongzuo de Tongzhi (国土资源部关
于开展 2016 年度土地矿产卫片执法监督检查工作的通知) [Notice on Legal En-
forcement, Supervising and Monitoring Work through Satellite Pictures in 
2016], MINISTRY OF LAND AND RES. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (中华
人民共和国国土资源部 ), http://www.mlr.gov.cn/zwgk/zytz/201612/t20161206_ 
1423514.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2017). 
62. Original Data from Guotu Ziyuan Bu (国土资源部) [Ministry of Land and 
Resources], Zhongguo Guotu Ziyuan Nianjian (中国国土资源统计年鉴) [China 
Land and Resources Statistical Yearbook] 2006–2016. 
 63. Zhan Yan, China Seeks a Balance Between Food Security and Urbani-
zation, PERMANENT MISSION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO THE 
U.N. (Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/nationalday2008/ 
t513215.htm. 
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of more specific laws serving various functions.64 These multi-
ple laws and ordinances address different aspects of land insti-
tutions while sharing similar goals, concepts, and frameworks, 
but they also represent tension, conflict, and inconsistency 
within the legal system. Such a complicated system affords lo-
cal governments leeway for manipulation and tweaking. When 
local governments tweak various parts of the national legal 
system, their law-breaking intention is less clear than when 
they choose to act under the national authority’s radar, in 
which case they clearly know that they are violating the law. In 
the case of tweaking, however, regardless of legality or illegali-
ty, local governments at the very least know that their actions 
are inconsistent with national practice. Because their tweaking 
of the law can be attributed in part to the ambiguity or incon-
sistency of national law, though, they can claim more legitima-
cy for that behavior than for flagrant illegality. However, law-
tweaking is defensive rather than offensive in seeking legitima-
cy from the higher law or the national policy agenda. The local 
governments that take on such action often have no clear na-
tional agenda, but are seeking only to find national legal basis 
for their local agendas.  
The following is a good example. In 2011, after the State 
Council promulgated the Regulations on Expropriation of 
Houses on State-Owned Land (the “2011 Regulations”),65 local 
governments across the country formulated implementary reg-
ulations.66 Although some of these local regulations were pure-
 
 64. These specific laws include the Urban Real Estate Administration 
Law, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengshi Fangdichan Guanli Fa (中华人
民共和国城市房地产管理法) [Urban Real Estate Administration Law] (promul-
gated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 
1, 1995, amended on Aug. 30, 2007 and Aug. 27, 2009) (China), and the Rural 
Land Contract Law, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Nongcun Tudi Chengbao 
Fa (中华人民共和国农村土地承包法) [Rural Land Contract Law] (promulgated 
by the Nat’l People’s Cong. Standing Comm., Aug. 29, 2002, effective Mar. 1, 
2003) (China). 
 65. Guoyou Tudi shang Fangwu Zhengshou yu Buchang Tiaoli (国有土地
上房屋征收与补偿条例) [Regulation on the Expropriation of Buildings on State-
owned Land and Compensation] (promulgated by the State Council, Jan. 21, 
2011, effective Jan. 21, 2011) (China). 
 66. For example, on October 19, 2011, the Shanghai City Government is-
sued its Implementation Regulations on the Expropriation of Buildings on 
State-Owned Land and Compensation in Shanghai. Shanghaishi Guoyou Tudi 
Shang Fangwu Zhengshou yu Buchang Shishi Xize (《上海市国有土地上房屋征
收与补偿实施细则》) [Implementation Regulations on the Expropriation of 
Buildings on State-Owned Land and Compensation in Shanghai] (promulgat-
ed by the Shanghai Municipal People’s Gov., Oct. 19, 2011, effective Oct. 19, 
2011) (China). On November 13, 2011, the Gansu Province Government issued 
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ly implementary in nature, some created new rules that deviat-
ed from or even jeopardized the national regulations. For ex-
ample, Wuhan, a leading city in central China, introduced a 
two-part clause designed to simplify the expropriation proce-
dure and weaken the bargaining power of potential hold-out 
owners.67 The first part of the clause copied article 13 of the 
2011 Regulations, whereas the second part granted local land-
administration agencies the direct power to revoke individual 
land-rights certificates in accordance with expropriation deci-
sions.68 In other words, land-rights holders within the area des-
ignated for expropriation would lose their property rights the 
moment the government issued its eminent domain decisions—
prior to any negotiation between the condemnor and the con-
demnee. In one publicly reported occurrence, the Wuhan gov-
ernment had revoked more than three hundred land-use rights 
(LUR) certificates through a notice on its website and then bro-
ken into houses that had lost their valid LUR certificates to 
force the occupants’ eviction.69 The second part of the clause 
appears to be a straightforward application of article 28 of the 
PL, which stipulates that a change in property rights takes ef-
fect the moment that expropriation or judicial decisions or arbi-
 
its Several Regulations on the Implementation of the “Regulation on the Ex-
propriation of Buildings on State-owned Land and Compensation” in Gansu. 
Gansu sheng Shishi Guoyou Tudi Shang Fangwu Zhengshou yu Buchang 
Tiaoli Ruogan Guiding (甘肃省实施《国有土地上房屋征收与补偿条例》若干规定) 
[Several Regulations on the Implementation of the “Regulation on the Expro-
priation of Buildings on State-owned Land and Compensation” in Gansu] 
(promulgated by Gansu Provincial People’s Gov., Nov. 13, 2011, effective Jan. 
1, 2012) (China). After the issuance of Order No. 590, according to original le-
gal research conducted by the author on a database compiled by Peking Uni-
versity, as of October 28, 2017, more than three hundred implementation doc-
uments have been issued across the country, including nine local regulations 
(地方性法规), thirty-two local government rules (地方政府规章), two hundred 
eighty-four local regulatory documents (地方性文件), three local judicial docu-
ments (地方司法文件), and two local working documents (地方工作文件).  
 67. Wuhan Shi Guoyou Tudi Shang Fangwu Zhengshou yu Buchang Shi-
shi Banfa (武汉市国有土地上房屋征收与补偿实施办法 武汉市人民政府令第 234
号 ) [Implementation Regulations on Expropriation of Buildings on State-
owned Land and Compensation in Wuhan City] (promulgated by the Wuhan 
City Gov., Oct. 13, 2016, effective Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.wpl.gov.cn/pc-361 
-101899.html (China). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Xuan Hua (滑璇) & Luxiao Wang (王露晓), (公告一出，产权证作废? 武
汉汉阳注销 330拆迁户不动产证引争议) [Property Rights Certificate Invalidated 
Once Expropriation Notice Issued? The Revocation of 330 LUR Certificates 
Gives Rise to Disputes], NANFANG ZHOUMO (南方周末) [S. WKLY.] (Jan. 20, 
2017), http://www.infzm.com/content/122445. 
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tration awards take effect.70 The problem is that the term ex-
propriation decision in the PL, which was passed in 2007, re-
fers to the entire expropriation process, and thus differs from 
the term’s use in the 2011 Regulations, which distinguish be-
tween expropriation decisions and compensation decisions, 
with the former only initiating the expropriation process.71 The 
2011 Regulations also specify which procedures a local govern-
ment should follow in conducting expropriation, procedures the 
Wuhan city government intentionally evaded by referring to 
the earlier PL.72 
3. Beyond the Law: Can a City Government Interpret the 
Constitution? 
When a local government chooses to go beyond the law and 
seek legitimacy from higher laws or policy goals, it is acting 
flagrantly illegally, albeit while making a claim for legitimacy. 
Doing so more bluntly manipulates rather than tweaks the law, 
as well as more severely encroaches the national authority, 
which alone has the power to define higher laws such as the 
constitution and set the national policy agendas.73 Nevertheless, 
even in a centralized, authoritarian country such as China, lo-
cal governments refer to higher laws or national agendas from 
time to time to justify practices that deviate from national laws. 
Such high-profile illegality may simply be a byproduct of local 
government leaders’ economic development efforts, or may have 
 
 70. Article 28 of the Property Law stipulates that: “Where a real right is 
created, changed, transferred or eliminated for a legal document of the peo-
ple’s court or arbitration commission or a requisition decision of the people’s 
government, etc, the real right shall become effective upon the effectiveness of 
the legal document or the expropriation decision of the people’s court.” Zhong-
hua Renmin Gongheguo Wuquan Fa (中华人民共和国物权法) [Property Law of 
the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.npc.gov.cn/ 
englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471118.htm (China).  
 71. Compare expropriation decision in article 28 of the Property Law of 
the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国物权法), id. 28, with expropria-
tion decisions in chapters two and three of the 2011 Regulations,  
Guoyou tudi shang fangwu zhengshou yu buchang tiaoli (国有土地上房屋征收
与补偿条例) [Regulation on the Expropriation of Buildings on State-owned 
Land and Compensation] (promulgated by the State Council, Jan. 21, 2011, 
effective Jan. 21, 2011) (China). 
 72. See Guoyou tudi shang fangwu zhengshou yu buchang tiaoli (国有土地
上房屋征收与补偿条例) [Regulation on the Expropriation of Buildings on State-
owned Land and Compensation] (promulgated by the State Council, Jan. 21, 
2011, effective Jan. 21, 2011), ch. 2 (China).  
 73. QIANFAN ZHANG, THE CONSTITUTION OF CHINA: A CONTEXTUAL 
ANALYSIS 84–96 (2012). 
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a clear agenda to establish a national model. In any event, local 
governments’ illegalities spur national dialogue and debates, 
and often exert lasting impact nationwide. For example, the 
Shenzhen city government interpreted the PRC Constitution in 
an idiosyncratic manner to serve its own industrial develop-
ment, providing a good case for illustrating how local govern-
ments go beyond the law to design their own land institutions 
and rules.74 In 2003, the Shenzhen city government initiated 
what it called the “land nationalization after urbanization” (城
市化转地) campaign.75 It declared that Shenzhen had completed 
the urbanization process to become the first city in China with-
out agriculture or farmers.76 
Accordingly, all land within its jurisdiction should be state-
owned pursuant to article 10 of the PRC Constitution, which 
states that “urban land is state-owned.”77 It therefore followed 
that the Shenzhen city government could take all land previ-
ously owned by villagers without implementing any eminent 
domain procedures because it was not exercising eminent do-
main but rather state land ownership. Shenzhen’s land nation-
alization constituted a serious encroachment of villagers’ land 
rights. It also constituted an intentional misinterpretation of 
the PRC Constitution and LAL to circumvent the increasingly 
strict land expropriation approval procedure implemented by 
the central government. In its one-year campaign, the Shen-
zhen city government took over 594 square kilometers of land 
from roughly 300,000 indigenous villagers in the name of land 
nationalization.78 Its motivation was to grab land from farmers 
to supply to industrial investors.79 The Shenzhen city govern-
ment managed to complete its land nationalization before the 
MLR could stop it, although the MLR publicly declared after-
wards that “this practice in Shenzhen cannot serve as a prece-
dent” (深圳做法，下不为例).80 The MLR was right to be con-
cerned about the potential precedent effect, as quite a number 
of other cities and counties followed suit by converting farmers 
 
 74. See SHITONG QIAO, CHINESE SMALL PROPERTY: THE CO-EVOLUTION OF 
LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 138–42 (2017). 
 75. Id. at 138. 
 76. Id. 
 77. XIANFA art. 10 (2004) (China). 
 78. QIAO, supra note 74, at 138–39. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 139. 
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into urban residents and declaring their land urbanized and 
therefore owned by the state.81  
II.  DOES COMPETITION MATTER FOR LAND RIGHTS?   
The concept of competitive federalism argues that inter-
jurisdictional competition curbs property rights abuses by local 
governments.82 It originates from Charles Tiebout’s classic ar-
ticle A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, which posits that 
“[i]f consumer-voters are fully mobile, the appropriate local 
governments, whose revenue-expenditure patterns are set, are 
adopted by the consumer-voters.”83 In other words, “local gov-
ernment represents a sector where the allocation of public 
goods . . . need not take a back seat to the private sector.”84 
Property protection is a form of public good, the value of which 
can be capitalized into markets. But land is immobile and it 
seems that land rights holders would not be able to vote by foot. 
If that is the case, do local governments still compete on land 
rights protection? What are they competing for? What is the 
nature of the interjurisdictional competition? 
A. LAND IMMOBILITY IS NOT THE PROBLEM!  
Leading scholars contend that competitive federalism is 
unlikely to provide effective protection for property rights in 
land because property is an immobile asset.85 Professor Somin, 
for example, argues that people who vote with their feet by 
leaving a jurisdiction cannot take their land with them.86 For 
this reason, interjurisdictional competition is unlikely to pro-
tect property rights in land effectively, although it may prove 
more useful in the case of rights to mobile property. Professor 
Epstein further argues that “[t]he first weakness of the exit 
right under the federalist system concerns cases with specific 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Somin, supra note 2, at 54. 
 83. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416, 424 (1956). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 78 (arguing that because 
real property is immobile, it is excluded from some of the benefits of federal-
ism); Epstein, supra note 9, at 155–57 (explaining the difficulty for landowners 
and developers of abandoning a project because they are tied to the location); 
Somin, supra note 2, at 54 (arguing competitive federalism is unlikely to pro-
vide effective protection for property rights in land because property is an im-
mobile asset). 
 86. Somin, supra note 2, at 54.  
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assets tied to a single jurisdiction,” and also that “the landown-
er is tied to the location, and so long as the political forces are 
aligned against him—nothing can stop the losses.”87 Professors 
Bell and Parchomovsky claim that “relocation costs are a dis-
tortion of the market for property forms.”88 They propose allow-
ing the residents of one state to choose property forms in other 
jurisdictions without relocating to promote interjurisdictional 
competition on property rights protection.89 Professor Ellickson 
acknowledges that the immobility of land reduces the political 
pressure on states and cities to treat landowners fairly, but 
concludes that interjurisdictional competition still works for 
two reasons.90 First, governmental abuse of property rights in a 
given jurisdiction lowers property values across the jurisdiction, 
which affects politically advantaged and disadvantaged citizens 
alike.91 Second, in addition to land, landowners also own other 
more mobile assets that governments do not wish to lose to 
neighboring jurisdictions.92 
If we place this federalism debate into a broader context 
and trace it back to the areas of corporate governance and envi-
ronmental regulation from which the debate both originated 
and has sparked several generations of discussions,93 we can 
more clearly examine whether land institutions differ from cor-
porate governance or environmental regulation. Land is actual-
ly not as separable or different from a corporation or a factory 
as it might at first appear; the distinction between mobile and 
immobile property is not as clear as it looks. Corporate govern-
ance provides a perfect example for interjurisdictional competi-
tion because corporations can change their registration situs at 
very low cost, whereas environmental law and property law dif-
 
 87. Epstein, supra note 9, at 155–56.  
 88. Bell and Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 102. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Ellickson, supra note 2, at 762 n.66. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See generally Marcel Kahan, The State of State Competition for Incor-
porations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 
(Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2015) (examining the desirability 
of federal corporate law as an alternative to the law of the firm’s state of in-
corporation); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 
95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 599–613 (1996) (reviewing the environmental federal-
ism debate); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Re-
thinking the “Race-To-The-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regu-
lation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (arguing for state rather than federal 
environmental regulation).  
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fer in the sense that the costs of moving operations from one ju-
risdiction to another to escape overly stringent environmental 
or property regulations are much higher.94 However, it is just a 
matter of degree. Relocation always involves replacing some-
thing in a given jurisdiction, be it land, employees, pensions, 
etcetera, with something in another jurisdiction. Relocation 
costs are universal across the areas of corporate governance, 
environmental regulations, and property institutions. Local 
governments do have the power to make the exercise of the 
right to exit costly, be it corporations, factories, or a plot of 
land.95 A city government can simply delimit a date by which 
all property, regardless of movable or immovable, within its ju-
risdiction is subject to the regulation in question. It is not fea-
sible to simply relocate a targeted property to avoid such regu-
latory costs, even if it is mobile. The idea that somebody can 
simply relocate his or her property, which can be a plot of land, 
a factory, or a corporation, after a particular regulation or deci-
sion has been passed is fanciful, and could be illegal if the 
property were targeted by the government. The question then 
is whether local governments would impose such costs or pro-
hibition on corporations, investors, or landowners. 
There are two risks for local governments: existing resi-
dents will flee and potential residents will not come. What mat-
ters most is the future and therefore the second risk: the deter-
rence of potential residents and investors. Even a city leader 
with a term lasting only a couple of years will consider not only 
the corporations or residents already in his or her jurisdiction 
but also potential corporations or residents deciding where to 
locate.96 It is reputational costs rather than the immediate loss 
of existing residents or corporations that constrain local gov-
ernments from abusing corporations or residents. Immobility is 
not a substantive issue if we adopt a temporal perspective or 
view property protection as a sequential game in which poten-
tial investors consider how local governments treat existing in-
vestors. There is a potential chilling effect that a local leader 
 
 94. See Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 97–98, 104. 
 95. Chinese local governments have a tendency of local protectionism, 
which hinders the free moving of corporations across the country. See Rodden 
& Rose-Ackerman, supra note 3, at 1547–55 (discussing how local govern-
ments in China have an incentive to limit imports, monopolize sale, and tax 
exports); see also Bai Chong-En et al., “Local Protectionism and Regional Spe-
cialization: Evidence from China’s Industries,” 63 J. OF INT’L ECON. 397 (2004) 
(researching regional specialization and local protectionism in China).  
 96. Cheung, supra note 6, at 28.  
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with a reasonable time horizon will take into consideration.97 
That is why Chinese local governments dare not confiscate in-
vestment, a large part of which—such as factories—is actually 
immobile. 
B. WHAT ARE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS COMPETING FOR? 
Interjurisdictional competition in China clearly promotes 
economic development, primarily via local governments’ expro-
priation of resources, mainly land, from less-productive sectors, 
such as agriculture, and distributing them to more-productive 
industrial sectors. 98  Government intervention reduces the 
transaction costs for investors,99 and even provides protection 
for investment in the face of competitive pressure. What has 
been largely ignored, however, is the impact of such interven-
tion on individual rights to less-productive property. The down-
side of prioritizing economic development is the downgrading—
and even sacrifice—of individual rights if they conflict with de-
velopment goals.  
Professors Acemoglu and Robinson argue, in Why Nations 
Fail, that China does not adequately protect property rights 
and therefore its economic growth is unsustainable.100 Many 
economists would argue, however, that local governments in 
China provide a decent level of investment protection.101 Ace-
moglu and Robinson’s argument is based on the study of the 
Tieben case, in which the owner of Tieben steel company lost 
its investment due to the change of policy.102 However, even in 
this case, the Changzhou city government protected and fully 
supported the company and suffered together with its owner 
 
 97. See Wan Jiang (万江), Zhongguo de Difang Fazhi Jianshe Jingzheng 
(中国的地方法治建设竞争) [Legal Competition within Local Governments in 
China], 25 (中外法学) [PEKING U. L.J.] 817, 824–27 (2013). 
 98. See Shitong Qiao & Frank K. Upham, China’s Changing Property Law 
Landscape, in COMPARATIVE PROPERTY LAW: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 311, 311–
32 (Graziadei & Smith eds., 2017). 
 99. Qijing Yang (杨其静), Fenquan, Zengzhang yu Bugongping (分权, 增长
与不公平) [Separation of Power, Growth and Inequality], 4 (世界经济) [WORLD 
ECON.] 102, 106 (2010). 
 100. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE 
ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY AND POVERTY 437–38 (2013). 
 101. See, e.g., Joseph P.H. Fan et al., Institutions and Foreign Direct In-
vestment: China Versus the Rest of the World, 37 WORLD DEV. 852 (2009) (ar-
guing that China has a quality government that promotes foreign direct in-
vestment). 
 102. Acemoglu & Robinson, supra note 100, at 437–38. 
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from the central government’s selective enforcement. 103  The 
neglected part of the story is that the Changzhou government 
had facilitated Tieben’s expansion by expropriating a consider-
able amount of land from farmers and transferring it to Tieben, 
in violation of central government regulations.104 Having lost 
their land and shelter, many farmers were reduced to living in 
abandoned boats and cement pipes.105 Local government offi-
cials had in fact been so eager to expropriate rural land on Tie-
ben’s behalf, in order to make it the top steel company in Asia, 
that they had exceeded the company’s original request for ap-
proximately 2000 mu of land, or 329 acres, by approximately 
3988 mu, or 656 acres.106 It was thus with the Changzhou gov-
ernment’s hearty endorsement, encouragement, and full sup-
port that Tieben decided to expand its operations.107 Why did 
local officials in Changzhou behave in this manner? Because of 
competitive pressure from neighboring cities. Changzhou had 
been ranked the lowest in economic growth of the three main 
cities in southern Jiangsu province—Suzhou, Wuxi, and 
Changzhou—although two decades before the three cities had 
enjoyed roughly the same level of economic development. 108 
Changzhou government officials thus considered Tieben’s ex-
pansion an opportunity to turn the situation around.109 If the 
central government had not selected Tieben as an example to 
signal to the whole country that the steel industry was experi-
encing a bubble that needed to be burst, the company’s—and 
local government officials’—plan would likely have succeeded, 
at least in the short run. Regardless of the outcome, the major 
cost was borne by the farmers who lost their land. 
Chinese local governments can be considered as “super 
growth machines,” and exhibit two major characteristics: they 
are (1) development-oriented and (2) conducive to power-
 
 103. Junjie Li (李军杰 ) & Weifeng Zhou (周卫峰 ), Jiyu Zhengfujian 
Jingzheng de Difang Zhengfu Jingji Xingwei Fenxi: Yi Tieben Shijian Weili (基
于政府间竞争的地方政府经济行为分析——以 “铁本事件” 为例) [Analysis on the 
Economical Behavior of Local Governments Based on Competitions Between 
Governments—Based on the Example of “Tieben Case”], 1 (经济社会体制比较 
页) [COMP. SOC. & ECON. SYS.] 51 (2005).  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.; Chinese Weights and Measures, CHINASAGE, http://www.chinasage 
.info/measures.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2018) (explaining China’s standard of 
weights and measures). 
 107. Li & Zhou, supra note 103. 
 108. Id. at 51–52. 
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business alliances. 110  Sociologists Harvey Molotch and John 
Logan offer the most vivid formulation of the term growth ma-
chine, arguing that urban politics and policy-making are domi-
nated by a coalition of businesspeople and various “politically 
mobilized local elites” who are united in their shared interest in 
economic growth.111 The central government has granted city 
and county governments across the country a great deal of au-
tonomy to manage their own economies, thereby encouraging 
competition among them. Economic growth means the transfer 
of resources from lower- to higher-productivity sectors or, more 
specifically in the case of China, the transfer of land from agri-
cultural use to industrial use; this, in turn, has fueled China’s 
fast-paced industrialization and urbanization over the past 
three decades.112 The imbalance in the allocation of tax author-
ity also renders local governments reliant on land to finance 
their operations.113 
Moreover, within local government jurisdictions, mobile 
capital often has a louder voice than immobile land interests. 
That is not to say that capital and land cannot be integrated. 
Investors can, and often do, hold land rights, and real estate 
developers are also powerful players in Chinese cities.114 How-
ever, we need to distinguish between individual land rights and 
the property rights of big business interests. In China, individ-
uals do not have voting rights, and thus cannot decide who the 
next mayor of their city will be, and their participation in local 
governments is quite limited.115 They can protest, but protests 
jeopardize governance only when they accumulate to a certain 
scale. Individual property-rights holders, be they farmers or 
urban housing owners, enjoy much less mobility than investors. 
Farmers cannot sell their land, even if they choose to work in 
another locale. Urban housing owners have slightly more free-
dom, in that they can select the city in which they buy, but 
housing choices are generally secondary to job choices.116 For 
most citizens, moving to a new city is a life-changing event, and 
 
 110. Wendell Pritchett & Shitong Qiao, Exclusionary Megacities, 91 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 10). 
 111. See Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Politi-
cal Economy of Place, 82 AM. J. SOC. 309, 310–14 (1976). 
 112. Qiao & Upham, supra note 98, at 312–13. 
 113. Qiao, supra note 22, at 103. 
 114. Pritchett & Qiao, supra note 110, at 28.  
 115. Id. at 25–26. 
 116. Within a city, parents also consider the quality of the public school 
district. See Been, supra note 2, at 523.  
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it is therefore very costly to exercise the right to exit in protest 
over local government policies. 
Theoretically, real estate developers can be seen as a proxy 
for housing consumers: the weakening of individual property 
rights exerts a negative impact on housing demand and prices, 
and therefore induces real estate developers to lobby local gov-
ernments on behalf of housing consumers.117 However, there 
are two main problems with this view. First, the proxy is im-
perfect at best, as developers do not experience uncertainty in 
the same way that consumers do.118 Even if we take developers 
as proxy for housing consumers, there is a significant agency 
cost involved.119 Second, and more importantly in the Chinese 
context, the interests of developers and individual property 
owners often conflict because the former do not buy land from 
the latter, as in the United States, but rather rely on the gov-
ernment to expropriate land from individuals.120 The result is 
an alliance between local governments and real estate develop-
ers, which profit from expropriating land at low prices and then 
selling the houses built thereon at multiple times the cost of 
land and construction. Therefore, developers benefit more from 
weak individual rights than they lose from the theoretically 
possible shrinkage of housing demand and prices.121 
Lastly, incomplete property rights in both rural and urban 
China provide local governments with incentives to grab land 
from individual property owners. Under Chinese law since the 
1998 LAL revision, local governments enjoy monopoly power to 
convert rural land to urban land and from agricultural use to 
manufacturing use.122 They do so by expropriating land from 
farmers, whose compensation is calculated by the land’s agri-
cultural value, which is much lower than its value for industri-
al or other urban uses.123 In other words, although rural land is 
collectively owned in China, if we examine the bundle of sticks 
of collectively owned rural land, the most valuable stick, the 
right to develop the land, belongs to local governments rather 
 
 117. Id. at 529–33. 
 118. Epstein, supra note 9, at 154–59. 
 119. The author thanks Professor Richard Epstein for this point. 
 120. Qiao, supra note 22, at 93–95. 
 121. Theoretically property rights abuses will discourage a potential prop-
erty buyer and their costs will be negatively capitalized in property sales pric-
es if those abuses become widely known. See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 762–
63 n.66. 
 122. Qiao, supra note 22, at 98–103. 
 123. Id.  
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than to farmers or their collectives. Local governments can cap-
italize on that stick only by expropriating land from farmers. 
As a result, they have huge incentives to do so; otherwise, the 
development value of rural land would be left unrealized. 
C. WHAT KIND OF COMPETITION: SORTING OR AGGLOMERATION? 
Before we apply market logic to understand government 
behavior, we need to understand the logic of market competi-
tion. There are two kinds of markets: one is matching, which is 
a win-win process, and the other is winner-takes-all.124 
The Tiebout model and market-preserving federalism as-
sume the former: individuals and firms move among local gov-
ernments to take advantage of public policies that match their 
preferences, just like ordinary consumers look around for a 
seller who is willing to provide a particular service or product 
at a price both parties can agree upon.125 However, both the 
market of places and market of politics fall into the winner-
takes-all model in which a few places or local politicians be-
come nationwide winners by successfully gaining national at-
tention and agglomerating resources nationwide. Leading econ-
omists across the ideological spectrum have developed a field 
called agglomeration economics, the basic claim of which is that 
individuals and businesses make location decisions based on 
where other individuals and businesses have decided to lo-
cate.126 By locating themselves near specific others, individuals 
and businesses can benefit from reduced transportation costs 
for goods, capture information spillovers, and participate in 
larger and more specialized labor and consumption markets.127 
Agglomeration benefits can outweigh preferences for particular 
policies in the location decisions of both individuals and inves-
tors.128 Agglomeration economics explain why individual citi-
zens and investors choose to remain in New York, Silicon Val-
 
 124. See, e.g., Kristian Behrens & Frederic Robert-Nicoud, Survival of the 
Fittest in Cities: Agglomeration, Polarization, and Income Inequality, IDEAS 
Working Paper, http://ideas.repec.org/p/lvl/lacicr/0919.html; Mark Hulbert, 
Investing in a “Winner Takes All” Economy, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 9, 2017), https:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/investing-in-a-winner-takes-all-economy-1491790561. 
 125. David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1507–13 (2010). 
 126. Id. at 1509–10. 
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ley, Shanghai, or Beijing despite their unaffordable housing, 
traffic congestion, and bad (or even exclusionary) policies.129 
Now put yourself in the shoes of the mayor of a medium-
sized Chinese city, assuming that you are still decades from re-
tirement and eager for a promotion. Think about the pyramid 
structure of China’s bureaucratic system: on average, a city has 
about eight to nine counties within its jurisdiction,130 a prov-
ince has over a dozen cities, and there are 31 provinces in Chi-
na.131 Hence, the odds of a local leader being promoted to the 
next bureaucratic level are low, and, among a dozen or more 
peers, only one or two will win the promotion competition. This 
is not a matching process, but rather one in which just one or 
two winners will be chosen in each round. Economic develop-
ment, as measured by gross domestic product (GDP), is a key 
criterion in the evaluation and promotion of local government 
leaders in China, and urbanization and industrialization have 
been the driving forces behind the country’s impressive eco-
nomic development.132 Think about Shenzhen, a shining model 
of industrialization and urbanization that, over the course of 
less than forty years, has been transformed from an agricultur-
al county with about 300,000 farmers and fishermen into the 
fourth largest city in China with over eighteen million peo-
ple,133 and garnered a reputation as China’s Silicon Valley.134 
So, as mayor, what are you going to do? You want to turn your 
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city into another Shenzhen, full of investors and skyscrapers, or 
at least into a mini-Shenzhen in your region. In any case, you 
want to attract enough investment for economic development. 
However, you must never forget that your peers and competi-
tors in the region’s other cities have the same goals, and in-
vestment is scarce and must be agglomerated in a particular 
place to generate benefits. 
Industrial investment brings GDP growth with little time 
lag.135 For local leaders whose terms are, on average, about 
four to five years, assigning land to investors in their first two 
years in office can equate to GDP growth in the next two to 
three years, regardless of whether those investors’ enterprises 
are successful in the long run.136 This also gives city leaders an 
incentive to take land for industrial development. This type of 
political competition is a race to the bottom owing to China’s 
pyramid bureaucratic structure, wherein a local leader’s 
chances of promotion are based on his or her performance rela-
tive to that of his or her peers in competing cities rather than 
on his or her absolute performance. Although other factors such 
as political connections also play a role, a city leader cannot 
risk losing the economic competition. Scholars have compiled 
empirical evidence demonstrating the correlation between in-
dustrial land assignment and the promotion of city leaders.137 
Leaders need to attract as much industrial investment as pos-
sible, certainly more than their peers in other cities, which 
means that the amount of investment needed and the condi-
tions under which it is attracted are determined neither by real 
societal demand nor the specific situation of their cities, but ra-
ther by the amount of investment and conditions competing cit-
ies are offering. The result is that city leaders compete with one 
another on the amount of land (usually oversupplied) and price 
of land (often much lower than a well-functioning market 
would offer) they assign to industrial investors.  
The nature of agglomeration economies ensures that inter-
jurisdictional competition among Chinese local governments is 
not a win-win game, but rather a race to the bottom for most. 
 
 135. Qijing Yang (杨其静) & Yanqiong Peng (彭艳琼), Jinsheng Jingzheng 
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板数据的分析) [Promotion Competition and the Transfer of Industrial Land—
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Local governments, in their role as landlords, are willing to 
grant land at low prices (or even for free) to industrial inves-
tors. They hope that the resulting industrial development will 
not only generate tax revenue, which is to be shared with the 
central government, but also positive spillover effects, namely, 
development of the commercial and service sectors, which in 
turn generate business tax, 100% of which goes to local gov-
ernments.138 Manufacturing enterprises can agglomerate peo-
ple in a certain area. Population flows into a city generate de-
mand for housing and push up housing prices, which relates to 
an important motivation for local governments: land sale reve-
nues. Local governments control 100% of land-sale revenues.139 
From 2000 to 2012, local governments accrued total revenue of 
160 trillion yuan, a larger sum than all local taxes combined.140  
The foregoing economic-development model makes use of 
the agglomeration effect of industrial development. It is true 
that local governments in China can internalize the costs and 
benefits of industrial development because they monopolize the 
land supply.141 The model also works for a few cities, repre-
sented by Shenzhen in the Pearl River Delta and Suzhou in the 
Yangtze River Delta. However, the distribution effect of ag-
glomeration has not received sufficient attention. Not every 
small county can grow into a big city like Shenzhen. Agglomer-
ation means that industries and economic activities are, in the 
long run, concentrated in a few large cities.142 Assume that ten 
counties are competing with one another for industrial invest-
ment in the expectation that it will boost commercial and ser-
vice activities and, consequently, housing prices. In the long 
run, however, only one or two will be successful in drawing suf-
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ficient investment and population to their jurisdictions to gen-
erate agglomeration effects. The rest will be losers in the com-
petition game. At the outset, each competitor will reduce prices 
below what they would be in an isolated jurisdiction in the 
hopes of winning the game because its offering price depends 
on those of its competitors. In other words, a city government’s 
decision to assign industrial land to an investor depends not 
only on its land-expropriation cost and the direct tax revenue 
the investor will pay, but also on the industrial investment’s 
potential spillover effect on residential housing prices, as well 
as whether it can win the interjurisdictional competition to 
generate agglomeration effects. However, owing to the nature 
of agglomeration, most cities will lose the competition. This 
race-to-the-bottom competition among Chinese local govern-
ments constitutes the prisoner’s dilemma. 
Without competitive pressure, local governments would 
likely have granted land to investors at higher prices than in 
the real world. At present, industrial land prices are often only 
a tenth of residential land prices, or even lower.143 For exam-
ple, in Hangzhou, the average industrial land price in 2009 was 
483 yuan per square meter, whereas that for residential land 
was 1526 yuan per square meter.144 Numerous studies have re-
vealed that local governments commonly assign industrial land 
to investors at prices lower than the costs of expropriation and 
building infrastructure. 145  A former director of the Jiangsu 
Provincial Bureau of Land Administration puts it this way: 
Industrial land has grown very quickly in Jiangsu, but all towards 
similar industries and repeated constructions happen a lot; develop-
ment zones are everywhere and vicious competition on the basis of of-
fering land at lower prices, even publicly offering zero-price land, is 
triggering land occupation and waste.146 
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Economists have studied the supply of cheap industrial 
land, and lawyers have examined local government abuses of 
expropriation power, but rarely have scholars examined the 
connections between them systematically. A few have connect-
ed the prevalence of land expropriation with the huge gap be-
tween residential land prices and rural land compensation, but 
most expropriated rural land is turned over to industrial rather 
than residential development.147 Local government competition 
for industrial capital is the main cause of the prevalent land 
expropriation witnessed in China. 
III.  THE CONUNDRUM FOR AUTHORITARIAN 
FEDERALISM: CENTRALIZATION OR 
DECENTRALIZATION?   
This Article asks and answers the question of whether lo-
cal governments provide stronger or weaker property rights 
protection than the national government and why. More specif-
ically, it queries the divergence between national law and local 
practices in the eminent domain arena. My answer to the first 
question is that local governments take much more land than 
national law allows, rig national law, and create their own 
mechanisms of eminent domain that go against national law. 
My answer to the second question, why local governments pro-
vide weaker property-rights protection, is that interjurisdic-
tional competition for economic development motivates local 
governments to take more land than national law permits. 
Hence, such competition does weaken individual land rights. 
Assuming that you care about individual rights in China, 
the observation of rights-weakening federalism does not neces-
sarily lead to advocacy for centralization. The widespread ille-
gal takings by local governments, which run contrary to the na-
tional authority’s efforts to construct a centralized and unified 
system of property-rights protection, point to the failures of 
centralization, but certainly do not put decentralization for-
ward as the solution. After all, it is interjurisdictional competi-
tion that has worsened the protection of individual rights. This 
is the paradox of authoritarian federalism. The two components 
of the term are in conflict: authoritarianism emphasizes au-
thority and demands centralization, whereas federalism con-
ventionally cries out for decentralization and local autonomy. 
This internal tension or conflict speaks to the China paradox—
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the national government wants to control local governments 
but fails to do so because of information and administrative 
costs, meaning that local governments have actually become 
more powerful than and have a larger national impact than 
their counterparts in democratic countries. This Chinese style 
of federalism, or authoritarian federalism, is however inherent-
ly unstable. The more power local governments gain, the less 
control the national government retains, and vice versa. Losing 
too much control on either side seems to be a bad idea. When 
the national government loses control, local governments com-
pete to take land from farmers, which jeopardizes the national 
public good of social stability. At the same time, when local 
governments lose their autonomy, the national government 
fails to govern effectively or develop the economy efficiently. 
Centralization or decentralization? If it seems hard to 
choose, it is probably because that we have asked a wrong 
question. As Professors Jonathan Rodden and Susan Rose-
Ackerman write: 
An MPF would have to resemble a layer cake, with each distinct layer 
of government linked only by frosting, rather than a marble cake, in 
which the layers are swirled together. Jurisdictional lines separating 
levels of government in modern federal systems are rarely so well-
defined, and it is usually a mistake to view any jurisdictional unit as 
autonomous.148 
Chinese local governments’ manipulation of national property 
laws, including a relevant constitutional clause, testifies to the 
above argument that the jurisdictional lines separating various 
levels of government are rarely well-defined. What matters is 
not to delineate a clear boundary between national and local 
power, but the dynamic and pattern of national-local interac-
tions. By providing a taxonomy of illegality in national-local in-
teractions in the Chinese land-rights arena, this Article at-
tempts to pierce the structure of authoritarian federalism and 
identify the patterns of the national and local authorities’ in-
teractions with each other. 
The next step is finding a way to reform authoritarian fed-
eralism. Here, I make a start. The failure of national law with-
in rights-weakening federalism originates from the numbers; 
that is, a single national authority cannot overcome the huge 
information and administration costs involved in micromanag-
ing several thousand local-government units. However, there 
are ways to beat the numbers, for example, by mobilizing and 
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empowering individual citizens to monitor the local govern-
ments that are violating individual rights. Such mobilization 
and empowerment can be effected in two ways: first, through 
the judiciary, granting individual citizens access to challenge 
local governments in national courts to defend national laws; 
second, through local governance reform, thereby increasing 
both the voice and exit power of individual citizens.149 
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